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BAR BRIEFS
CODE REVISION
(Continued From Front Page)
Hiring; Liens; Livestock; Militia, Soldiers and Sailors; Mines and
Miners; Minors; Motor Vehicles; Municipal Government; Nego-
tiable Instruments; Nuisances; Obligations; Occupations and
Professions; Offices and Officers; Partnership; Probate Pro-
cedure; Property; Public Buildings and Institutions; Public Utili-
ties; Public Welfare; Recreation, Sports and Amusements; Sales
and Exchange; State Government; :Succession; Descent; Wills;
Taxation; Townships; Trusts, Uses and Powers; Warehousing
and Deposit; Waters; Weeds; Weights and Measures; Workmen's
Compensation; and General Provisions.
Each of these titles are being logically divided into chapters.
Some of these titles may have to be changed during the course of
revision. It would be very helpful if the members of the Bar
would consider these titles and make any suggestions which they
deem pertinent.
CODE COMMISSION.





Alternative Relief - There are two lines of authority upon
the question of whether the declaratory judgment is proper as an
alternative remedy. One view is that the remedy is proper only
when an ordinary remedy is not available. The second and seem-
ingly more reasonable attitude is that declaratory relief can be
had whether a remedy at law is to be had or not. Most authori-
ties consider this the majority and better interpretation. Bor-
chard, Declaratory Judgments, (1934) p. 151.
As yet, this issue has not been directly raised in any North
Dakota court, but on analysis of decided cases involving the
declaratory judgment, it appears that North Dakota leans toward
the majority view. In agreement to reduce the debt, and subse-
quent repudiation by the defendant city, plaintiff brought an
action for a declaratory judgment which was allowed by the
court, although it is plain that the action could have been brought
on the contract. Jones Lumber Co. v. City of Marmarth, 67 N. D.
309, 272 N. W. 190; (1937). In another case, State v. Divide
County, where the question of the paramountcy of a state mort-
gage and county tax liens were in issue, a declaration was allowed.
Here, the State could. have brought foreclosure proceedings as was
done in a similar case cited in the opinion of the court. State v.
Burleigh City, 55 N. D. 1, 212 N. W. 217; (1927). The court, in
ruling that action for declaratory relief was proper, listed the re-
quirements for the use of that remedy as follows: (1) a justici-
able controversy between (2) parties whose interests were ad-
verse, (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
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interest, and (4) the issues involved must be ripe for judicial
determination. Langer v. State, 284 N. W. 238 (1939). There is
no statement as to whether or not the declaratory judgment is
proper as an alternative remedy, but the natural implication from
the absence of any negative statement, is that relief by declara-
tion may be given whether there is a remedy at law or not.
On examination of the North Dakota law on this subject, the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, it seems capable of but one
interpretation. It reads in part: "Courts of record within their
respective jurisdictions shall have the power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed." Com. Laws of N. D., 1925 Supp. Sec. 7712al.
That is, even if the plaintiff could have or has asked for coercive
relief, the fact that he chose or also chose a declaration is not a
bar to his action. Continuing, that act states: "No action or pro-
ceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
judgment or decree is prayed for." Comp. Laws of N. D. 1925
Supp. Sec. 7712a. That is, even if coercive relief might have been
possible, the action is not open to objection because it was brought
for a declaration. Borchard, commenting on the Michigan act
which is identical to our own, says: "Thus a declaration may be
asked (1) even though a coercive decree is also sought; (2) even
though a coercive decree could be but is not sought; (3) or even
though a coercive decree could not have been sought..." Bor-
chard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 159, (1934).
Of course, there are numerous exceptions to the above
stated conclusions where it is in the discretion of the court as to
the propriety of declaratory relief. The Act especially provides
for such situations as follows: "The court may refuse to render or
enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or
decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncer-
tainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings." Comp.
Laws of N. D., 1925 Supp. Sec. 7712a6. So, if a declaration would
not satisfactorily dispose of the case, or if another method would
give a more satisfactory result, it is up to the discretion of the
court as to whether a declaratory judgment should be allowed.
The same situation arises if it appears that a pending suit will
better settle the issues involved. Where there is a special stat-
utory method for the determination of a particular type of case,
the courts uniformly hold that it is not proper for a declaration
to ursurp the statutory remedy as provided by legislative man-
date. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 148; (1934). Sev-
eral courts have fallen into error traceable to the above excep-
tions. Relying on cases where a declaration had been denied be-
cause of some exceptional circumstance, they reached the con-
clusion, that a "declaratory action could be employed only when
no ordinary remedy was available." Borchard, Declaratory Judg-
ments, p. 148; (1934).
The above quotation indicates the minority view, first estab-
lished by a ruling of the Supreme Court of Hawaii of 1923, the
court refusing to try by declaration the conflicting claims of two
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sets of officials of a fraternal society on the ground that Quo
Warranto was the proper remedy. Kakeikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii
420, (1923). This decision preceded a long line of cases holding
the declaratory judgment proper as an alternative remedy. Penn-
sylvania courts in certain will cases fell into the same error in
suggesting that the declaratory action could be employed only
when no ordinary form of action was available, because the main
purpose of the Act was to insure a speedy determination of issues.
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 150; (1934). In a Wash-
ington decision (1939) the court said, "The proceeding for a
declaratory judgment is not a substitute or alternative for the
common law or statutory actions existing when the declaratory
judgment act was passed in this state." Peoples Park v. An-
rooney, 100 Wash. Dec. 43, 93 P. (2d) 362. They relied partly on
a Minnesota decision which said, "The Act was not designed to
supplant other remedies well established and working satisfac-
torily." Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Billstein, (1928) 204 Minn.
224, 283 N. W. 138. Minnesota, in turn, relied on a New Hamp-
shire and a Pennsylvania decision along with several others as
authority. Lisbon Village Dis. v. Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 155 A.
252, 1931. Bell Tel. Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 A. 517, (1934.)
In the Pennsylvania case, a declaration had been denied because
of a special statutory remedy. These states and a few others re-
fuse to allow a declaratory judgment as an alternative remedy.
Briefly summarizing, under the minority holding declaratory
relief should be granted only when there is no other remedy
available. By the majority view, the courts will render a declara-
tory decree even though coercive relief is also sought, could be
sought, or could not be sought, with exceptions as before noted.
The latter holding is considered the sounder and more reasonable
one. Quoting Borchard, "A court should not insist that a plain-
tiff adopt his most drastic and expensive remedy, when a simple,
mild, and inexpensive remedy will determine the issue and pre-
serve his rights ... Self-restraint, the willingness to invoke arbi-
tration and declaration of rights instead of hostilities and coer-
cion, is a mark of civilization and should be encouraged, not dis-
couraged." Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 162; (1934).
It is submitted that the declaratory judgment should pro-
perty be considered as an alternative remedy, available whether or
not other relief is possible.
LARRY FOREST,
U. N. D. Law Student.
CAN A LAWYER MAKE A LIVING?
[This excerpt from an article with the above title in 'The Law
Student' by Irving Shore, of San Francisco, based in part on the
pamphlet 'The Economics of the Legal Profession' by Dean Lloyd
K. Garrison of the Wisconsin Law School, seems to indicate, (1)
that lawyers are not comparatively worse off than other profes-
sions, and (2) that the primary cause of the Bar's economic
